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RESPONSE TO ANDERSON, WARD,
AND RANDAZZO
Jeffrey Dudiak

I

n this issue we have been gifted with three credible, nay expert,
expositors of three interpretations of Quakerism in historical
perspective: Penn’s interpretation of Quakerism as “primitive
Christianity revived,” Barclay’s evolving interpretation of Quakerism’s
“inward Light” as vehiculum dei, and his speculation on a corresponding
spiritual sense, and the twentieth century development of Quaker
understandings of Christianity and universalism—mutually excluding
or complementary?—traced across the prestigious Swarthmore
Lectures.
If, as Paul maintains across his careful exegetical summary of No
Cross, No Crown, Penn’s late Seventeenth Century reading of early
Quakerism still carries weight as the richer context for many of our later,
less comprehensive interpretations, if at the extremes, as Madeleine
keenly shows us, Elton Trueblood interpreted Robert Barclay’s
theologizing interpretation of Quakerism as the consolidator and
the cornerstone of a rationally transmissible Quakerism, while Rufus
Jones understood Barclay as the betrayer of early Quakerism, if across
the ebb and flow of the Twentieth Century liberal Quakerism has
alternatively understood Christianity as assumed, then as accidental,
then central but not hegemonic, to true Quakerism, as DanChristy
has wonderfully highlighted for us, … in each case these discourses
highlight a conflict of interpretations, which raises the obvious question:
which one is correct? Which is the true interpretation, the reading that
gets Quakerism, original Quakerism, historical Quakerism, right? For
such arguments always have a sting at the end: the tacit, if not explicit,
assumption that this genuine reading of Quakerism, once established,
will be normative for Quakerism going forth. Such arguments are as
ubiquitous as they are interminable, both among the scholars and
among Quakers on the benches or pews, in part because what we
recognize as evidence in such debates is to some significant degree
overdetermined by the position for which we are advocating—a circle
(vicious or productive?) the consideration of which I shall return to
shortly.
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But by posing the question in this way—as our “modernist”
sensibilities induce us to do reflexively and thereby almost inevitably,
regardless of the “side” of the issues on which we find ourselves—
perhaps we are thinking about the matter in a less than maximally
felicitous way, in a way, I will suggest, that structurally quenches
the spirit we are, in such projects, attempting to summon forth.
Perhaps there is promise in not attempting to resolve these conflicts of
interpretation, as if the question of the true in the sense of the correct,
in the sense of getting Quakerism right, governed the field of play at
play in such matters, but to be in them in a different way. To this end,
I would like to reflect briefly upon two of the notions I have already
obliquely raised here, and that I think might help us illuminate this
space differently: truth, and spirit.
The English word “truth” has as part of its ancestry the now largely
disregarded, though still instructive, word “troth.” Those amongst us
with as much grey in their hair as I have will have heard this term
employed on the occasion of a marriage; “I pledge you my troth”
one used to say at the moment of solemnization (and—I have heard
rumors—one used to mean it, too). Troth, or truth, in this context,
has to do not with what is the case—our usual understanding of the
notion of truth today—but with what is being promised, with what is
not the case, or at least not yet the case. It means: I will be true to you.
Promises do not name, but create, reality. Troth, or truth, here, has
to do not principally with facts, but with faithfulness, a sense of truth
that has left its marks upon our language in phrases such as a “true
friend,” or being “true to your school.” While I do not have time to
fully make the case here, I want to suggest that faithfulness, rather
than factuality, is the deepest and primary sense of truth—that is, that
facts are considered true not because truth has principally to do with
facts, but because facts are one kind of truth, one kind of faithfulness,
the faithfulness of some proposition to some state of affairs. In our
modern world, increasingly over the past three or four centuries
(another yarn too long to spin in this forum), truth has become
almost entirely equated with factuality, rather than factuality being
recognized as one limited form of truth which, if it is to be more truly
true, more faithful, requires as its context a broader understanding of
truth, of truth as faithfulness in all of its variant and rich facets. As I
have suggested elsewhere, to the question, “how many Jews can be
fit into a cattle car?,” there is a technically correct answer, but there
can never be a true answer. When we reduce the true to the correct,
to getting things right, we live a lie, betray faithfulness, violate troth.
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And it is this deeper sense of truth as faithfulness that we need, or
so I am hinting at here, if we are to evaluate the truth of a religious
tradition, or an interpretation of such a tradition.
So you can see where I am going here. What if the question of the
truth of an historical or contemporary interpretation of Quakerism
had first to do not with the identification and naming of some essence
of Quakerism, of locating what Quakerism is, in fact, at its core really
all about, of providing a correct interpretation that can be upheld
over against false ones, but with faithfulness? But does this not just
push the question of essence back a step, the issue of what Quakerism
really is reasserting itself across the obvious rejoinder: But faithfulness
to what?
But here we must be careful, as the answer to this question cannot
be: Quakerism. Ironically, we cannot be faithfully in the tradition by
being faithful to the tradition. For traditions are not that to which we
are called to be faithful; to believe that they are leaves us with a stiff
and arid traditionalism. Rather, traditions themselves delineate transgenerational, communal attempts to be faithful to something that lies
beyond the tradition itself. We do not belong to a tradition by being
faithful to the tradition, but by committing ourselves to responding
to that to which the tradition is itself a response in a manner that is
consistent with, that resonates with, the trajectory traced out across
the tradition itself.
That is, to be faithful within a religious tradition is not principally
to be faithful to the tradition, but to join in the tradition as itself
a tradition of faithfulness. We become Quaker, or remain Quaker,
because we find in this way of being religious both the reality and the
promise of a faithful response to that to which we as a community
seek to be faithful, and I become or remain Quaker because I find
my own ability to be faithful to that to which I am called clarified and
supported and augmented by my association with the Society. True
Quakerism is not in the first instance qualified by some essential core
teaching or practice—Christian or universalist, mystical or theological,
primitive or progressive—rather, each of these are interpretative
attempts to articulate what faithfulness means for those who identify
with the Quaker manner of response in some context or another.
Truth here—and I would suggest this is not only the fundamental
meaning of religious truth, but the fundamental meaning of truth per
se—is neither a noun nor an adjective (neither the naming of some
state of affairs, nor the qualifying of some proposition corresponding
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to such a state of affairs), but an adverb: a matter living truly, living
faithfully—something which underwrites all matters of fact, as when
we guarantee the statements we make in a letter by undersigning it
with our personal guarantee of fidelity: “Yours truly,” which is to say,
“Yours faithfully.”
But does not the articulation of that to which the tradition is a
response give us the essence of the tradition, albeit an essence that lies
outside of the tradition itself? Perhaps, except that that “something
beyond” is only articulated across the tradition itself, and thus
needs to be perpetually re-generated across the trans-generational
commitment to faithfulness that constitutes the tradition. A tradition,
as itself a response, can never encompass that to which it is a response
within the response that it remains, even if the ability of the tradition
to gauge its faithfulness requires an articulation of that to which it
is an attempt to be faithful. Giving articulation to that to which our
tradition is a response is therefore an ongoing, communal project.
Which is why it is crucial to the continued existence of our Society
that we provide opportunities and fora—and jobs—to our fine, young
theologians, for whom this task constitutes their principal vocation,
some of whom are represented in this journal (sorry Paul).
But to articulate that to which the tradition is a response across
the response that is the tradition itself, to realize that which calls for
response within the response itself—such a project creates a circle
that is vicious if the goal is truth in the sense of the correct, in the
sense of getting it right, but a circle that is productive if we allow our
participation in it to draw us into the realm of the spirit. Indeed, it
is in this restless circulation between the ever emerging exigencies of
historical change and the trajectory already set out across the tradition
that the “spirit” takes on its most concrete manifestation, whatever
mysterious or mystical senses the term rightly retains, the tradition
answering to always new situational demands, and our understanding
and assessment of those demands answering to the insight and wisdom
embedded in the tradition—the systole and diastole of the beating
heart of a living tradition. A tradition not perpetually reinventing itself
in the face of constantly shifting realities is dead; a community no
longer addressing those realities out of its historically accumulated
resources is no longer part of the tradition in question.
That is, when the demands of the times, and of the sub-groups of
which we are a part, govern our readings of the tradition—determining
for us which parts of the tradition are essential and which accidental,
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in a way that excludes or overpowers a reciprocal emphasis on the
tradition informing and giving critical shape to our reading of these
same demands—we depart from the tradition, merely picking and
choosing pieces that we fashion into something blindly subservient to
our times, just as we are unfaithful to the tradition in insisting upon
“traditional” formulations which eclipse our hearing, and stunt our
answering to, the demands of the times in ways that challenge the
standard articulations of the tradition upon which we rely to address
them. In this realm of the spirit, in this domain of active truth, we are
beyond a prevailing concern with what is correct, and enter into the
domain of discernment, here understood as being led by the same
spirit that is progressively taking shape across our articulations of that
to which we are always already responding.
And it is this process that I understand to be already profoundly
underway in the three excellent expositions in these articles.

